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The paper explores the causes and effects of persistence in the discretionary allocation of public subsidies to 
R&D activities performed by private firms in high-tech and low-tech industries. It applies the distinction 
between  virtuous Matthew-effects and vicious Matthew-effects. The former qualifies the persistence in the 
discretionary allocation of public subsidies in terms of sheer reputation based upon previous awards. The 
latter is identified by the role of the accumulation of competence stemming from past grants in current R&D 
activities. Virtuous Matthew effects are found in high-tech industries where knowledge cumulability is higher. 
In traditional industries, vicious Matthew effects prevail for the lower levels of knowledge cumulability. Here 
reputation-Matthew-effects can lead to substitution of private funds with public ones. The empirical analysis 
is based on Transition Probability Matrices, probit regressions and Propensity Score Matching on around 700 
Italian firms in the years 1998-2003.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In the last decade there has been a rise in the perceived relevance of technology 
policy in promoting productivity and economic growth and large amounts of public 
funds have been spent on programs to stimulate the generation of new scientific 
knowledge in research institutions and to support innovative activities performed by 
private firms (OECD, 2007 and 2010). Indeed, the fostering of R&D investment is 
a major issue for long-term European policy strategy (European Commission, 2002 
and 2010; Archibugi and Filippetti, 2011). 
However,  it  has  been  recognised  that  relevant  government  failures  may  take 
place in this field of policy intervention (Niman, 1995) and that consequently there 
is considerable scope to improve the efficiency of government spending (Conte et 
al., 2009). In this paper we will focus on a specific but crucial issue i.e. the choice on 
the  targeting  of  policy  intervention  given  the  existence  of  structural  differences 
across sectors of economic activity (Jang and Huang, 2005; Crespi and Pianta, 2008). 
As  suggested  by  Ortega  Gilles  et  al.  (2010)  the  relationship  between  R&D  and 
productivity is not homogeneous across different industries. On the contrary, as 
they showed, R&D investment in high-tech sectors are more productive than in 
low-tech sectors: This evidence supports the view that industrial and innovation 
policies should be targeted at increasing R&D in high-tech sectors and at supporting 
overall capital formation in low-tech sectors. 
In this paper we will argue that not only fostering R&D in high-tech sectors might 
be  more  productive  but  that  the  effectiveness  of  a  traditional  major  tool  of 
innovation policy i.e R&D subsidies might be greater in high-tech sectors than in 
low-tech industries. This argument is theoretically grounded on the critique alleged 
by the literature to discretionary support to R&D activities because of the possible 
bias  in  favour  of  past  recipients,  with  the  creation  of  clubbish  procedures  of 
allocation based upon reputation effects that are not substantiated by actual research 
capabilities. In particular, the paper applies to research policy the notion of Matthew 
effects  drawn  from  the  economics  of  science  and  implements  the  distinction 
between virtuous and vicious Matthew effects. The former consist in the persistence of 
the physiological provision of subsidies to firms that have been actually able to use 
previous subsidies to effectively increase, in subsequent times, their R&D activities 
and innovation capabilities. The latter include the cases of pathological persistence 
in the assignment of public subsidies based on sheer reputation, even to firms that 
have  actually  reduced  their  commitment  to  research  after  receiving  previous 
subsidies (David, 1994). We argue that the characters of the knowledge generation 
process  play  a  key  role  in  discriminating  among  virtuous  and  vicious  Matthew 
effects. The levels of knowledge cumulability, R&D sunk costs and learning to learn 
have a direct bearing upon the likelihood that the prior allocation of public subsidies 
exerts a positive effect upon the actual capability of the recipients to undertake 
successful research processes. Since industrial sectors widely differ in terms of these 
aspects, we claim that sectoral patterns in the nature of Matthew effects can be 
identified and that while the allocation of public subsidies in high-tech sectors is 
likely  to  activate  virtuous  Matthew  effects,  when  firms  produce  in  traditional   3
industries selection committees are more likely to be biased by sheer reputation 
effects. 
The relevance of these arguments is empirically tested by implementing a 
framework of analysis based on transition probabilities matrixes, an econometric 
model of the determinants of firm’s access to R&D grants and an evaluation impact 
analysis applying the Propensity Score Matching method. The empirical analysis is 
based on the rich information contained in two waves of the Survey on Italian 
Manufacturing  Firms  realised  by  the  Unicredit  Group.  Each  wave  collects 
contemporary and retrospective (previous three years) data from samples of more 
than  four  thousand  firms.  In  order  to  obtain  a  dataset  for  the  study,  with  two 
distinct  points  of  observation,  it  has  been  necessary  to  merge  the  two  waves 
(covering the years from 1998 to 2003). The matched database, containing data for 
the years 1998-2003, covers around 750 manufacturing firms observed in both the 
two periods.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  2  provides  the  theoretical 
background for our analysis and discusses our hypotheses. Section 3 presents the 
empirical strategy of the study and the descriptive analysis, while sections 4 and 5 
discuss  respectively  methodology  and  results  of  the  econometric  analysis. 
Conclusions and policy implications are in Section 6. 
 
 
2.  The Matthew effect in discretionary R&D subsidies 
 
A critical issue in the discretionary allocation of R&D subsidies is related to the 
substantial persistence observed in the outcome of selection procedures. Such a 
persistence is usually meant to be dysfunctional since it suggests that committees 
that should identify the actual quality of the research projects are biased by the 
reputation of the firms performing them. The members of the selection committees 
would be too much influenced by the scientific and technological reputation of the 
candidates, rather than by the sheer quality of the projects. Actually the reputation 
of the candidates would become a reliable proxy for the quality of the projects. Such 
reputation would be strongly influenced by previous awards and specifically by the 
inclusion in precedent assignment tournaments. The claim is that firms that have 
already received a selective subsidy based upon discretionary procedures censed to 
screen  their  quality  of  the  projects  in  the  past  have  disproportionately  higher 
chances to be selected again, simply because of their acquired reputation, and not 
because of a correct assessment of their actual efforts. According to these criticisms 
a vicious ‘Matthew effect’, i.e. a dysfunctional persistence, would take place in the 
selective allocation of public subsidies based upon beauty contests. Their claim, in 
other words, is the evident persistence in the allocation of public subsidies by means 
of  beauty  contest  procedures  is  necessarily  perverse,  as  it  cannot  reflect  other 
dynamic effects that are not based upon reputation so as to lead to the inclusion of 
phoney innovators and the exclusion of ‘hungry orphans’ with high levels of research 
capabilities (See Table 1).   4
However, when knowledge cumulability matters and the allocation of subsidies in 
the past helps increasing the current competence of past recipients, the persistence 
in the allocation of public subsidies by means of discretionary procedures is not 
necessarily  product  of  dysfunctional  reputation  effects.  On  the  contrary,  the 
observed persistence can be the result of positive effects of past public subsidies on 
the current performances of firms in innovation activities. This argument builds 
upon the analysis of the knowledge generation process and the appreciation of the 
actual levels of knowledge cumulability. Knowledge generation is characterized by 
learning processes, high levels of sunk costs and hence economies of density and 
cumulability. New knowledge impinges upon the competence acquired by means of 
learning  processes  and  is  the  result  of  the  recombination  of  existing  bits  of 
knowledge. For a given amount of resources invested in R&D, the larger is the 
stock  of  knowledge  of  each  firm  and  the  larger  the  chances  to  generate  new 
technological  knowledge.  Consequently  the  larger  is  the  actual  cumulability  of 
knowledge and the stronger are the levels of competence, the higher the quality of 
research projects and hence the incentive for the recipients of public subsidies at 
time t-1 to perform and fund privately R&D activities at time t (Arrow, 1962a, 
1962b, 1969; Stiglitz, 1987; Romer, 1990; Weitzman, 1996). 
 
When knowledge cumulability is relevant, the persistence in the allocation of 
subsidies  would  simply  reflect  the  higher  levels  of  current  commitment  of  past 
recipients  in  R&D  activities.  The  intrinsic  non-ergodic,  persistent  character  of 
discretionary allocation processes is ‘virtuous’: there is no room for the allegation of 
an  economic  dysfunctionality.  Committees  members  are  perfectly  right  in 
confirming their preferences for firms that have taken advantage of previous awards 
simply  because  their  projects  reflect  a  larger  amount  of  inputs,  higher  levels  of 
competence and expertise and hence are simply of a higher and better quality. In 
this case the selection procedure is effectively able to sort out phoney innovators 
and to include, repeatedly, competent firms. When knowledge cumulability matters 
virtuous  ‘Matthew  effects’  are  more  likely  to  take  place  (Antonelli  and  Crespi, 
2011)2. 
The distinction between vicious and virtuous Matthew effects is most important 
with respect to the characteristics of the dynamics at work (see Table 1). Matthew 
dynamics is clearly non-ergodic as past events have an effect through time. When 
vicious  Matthew  effects  apply,  however,  the  dynamics  of  the  process  is  past 
dependent. Once a firm has received a subsidy, the snow-ball effect of cumulative 
and  self-reinforcing  reputational  effects  will  keep  going,  whatever  the  firm  does 
along  the  process.  When,  instead,  competence,  virtuous  Matthew  effects  apply, 
committee members should be able to value firms’ actual technological competence 
possibly enriched by previous grants allocation. In this case the process is path 
                                                 
2 As it is often the case in the recombinant generation of new knowledge, the application of a concept 
elaborated in a field to another one yields new and unexpected results as it provides new opportunities for 
investigation. The use of the notion of Matthew effects originally introduced in the sociology of science and 
elaborated in the economics of science to the economics of R&D is especially fertile for the larger availability 
of direct and qualified measures of the actual efforts and competence of researchers, that are often lacking in 
scientometrics  (Arora and Gambardella, 1997;  Arora et al., 1998).   5
dependent: the initial conditions – i.e. the allocation of a public subsidy at time t-1- 
does not guarantee that the firm will receive a subsidy in the future. In the virtuous 
Matthew  effect  the  past  allocation  increases  the  final  outcome  of  the  selection 
process if and when it actually increased the knowledge base and the competence of 
the firm, hence the profitability of current R&D. The virtuous Matthew effects may 
take place when knowledge cumulability stirred by past allocations exerts  positive 
effects  on  learning  to  learn  and  economies  of  density  in  performing  research 
activities characterized by sunk costs, but it is far from being automatic: the conduct 
of agents along the process matters in the actual definition of the levels of total 
R&D expenditures (David, Hall, Toole, 2000). 
 
[Table 1, about here] 
 
It  becomes  clear  that,  for  given  levels  of  competence  and  integrity  of  the 
selection  committees,  the  actual  levels  of  knowledge  cumulability,  knowledge 
economies of density and the actual rates of the dynamics of learning to learn play a 
major role in shaping the likelihood that either virtuous or vicious Matthew effects 
take  place.  Such  levels  vary  a  lot  across  industries  and  firms  (Antonelli,  Crespi, 
Scellato, 2010a and b). 
In the high-tech science based industries the generation of technological knowledge 
is  characterized  by  high  levels  of  cumulativity  with  actual  persistence  in  the 
introduction of innovations at the firm level (Ortega-Argiles et al., 2010; Antonelli et 
al., 2010). In these industries the experts of the selection committees have much 
more  opportunities  to  assess  the  actual  quality  of  the  research  projects:  the 
proximity  to  scientific  knowledge  helps  the  screening  process  and  favours  the 
inclusion of high quality projects and the exclusion of phoney innovators.  The 
allocation of public subsidies in prior discretionary rounds is likely to positively 
affect the actual enlargement of the knowledge base of the firm, to increase its 
opportunity  to  learn  to  learn  and  to  take  advantage  of  economies  of  density 
stemming from the sunk costs (Lee, 2011). Hence following Merton we can believe 
that  prior  subsidies  have  actually  been  instrumental  “for  enlarging  their  role  as 
investigators”  (Merton,  1968:57).  In  sum,  the  allocation  of  public  subsidies  by 
means of discretionary procedures in high-tech sectors is likely to activate virtuous 
Matthew effects (Gonzalez et al. , 2005 and 2008) and to complement internal funds 
for R&D activities (García-Quevedo, 2004). 
On  the  opposite,  in  traditional  sectors  where  the  cumulativity  of  technological 
knowledge is much lower, process innovations purchased from upstream suppliers 
prevail and the introduction of product innovation is occasional, there is a stronger 
possibility that the allocation of public subsidies based on discretionary procedures 
is more influenced by reputation effects (Almus, Czarnitzki, 2003; Busom, 2000). 
The members of the selection committees can rely less of the scientific content of 
the project to assess their quality. The reputation based upon previous inclusions 
may have stronger effects, because of higher levels of subjectivity in the assessment. 
The probabilities of inclusion of phoney innovators and unfair exclusion of true 
innovators –hungry orphans- are higher. The allocation of previous subsidies may   6
have engendered typical crowding out effects with the substitution of private funds 
with public ones and hence no increase in the actual levels of research intensity 
(Kauko, 1996; Klette et al., 2000).   
The  observation  of  the  actual  outcome  of  the  delivery  of  past  allocations  with 
respect to their additionality and effectiveness helps discriminating between the two 
types of Matthew effects. As far as the additionality is concerned it is important to 
assess  whether  the  provision  of  public  subsidies  has  led  to  the  substitution  of 
private  funds.  Virtuous    Matthew  effects  are  expected  to  be  dominant  where 
subsidies produce an increase of total R&D budgets and flows of innovation being 
introduced.  Instead,  vicious,  reputation  Matthew  effects  are  prevalent  where 
substitution of private funds with public subsidies is detected.  
Summing  up,  building  on  previous  arguments  our  set  of  hypotheses  can  be 
synthesized as it follows: 
 
H1: Matthew effects are at work with non-ergodic dynamics. We expect that 
significant persistence takes place in the allocation of public subsidies. 
H2:  Competence,  virtuous  Matthew  effects  matter  with  path  dependent 
dynamics in high-tech industries, where knowledge cumulability is higher and key 
characteristics of firms including research efforts can be considered as reliable clues 
reflecting the true levels of technological competence. Hence, we expect that in 
high-tech industries subsidies produce additionality effects in R&D efforts. 
H3:  Reputation,  vicious  Matthew  Effects  are  expected  to  apply  to  low-tech 
industries with past dependent dynamics. Reputation Matthew effects take place 
when  selection  committees,  unable  to  assess  the  true  content  of  the  research 
proposal,  because  of  its  low  scientific  content,  are  mainly  influenced  by  the 
information on previous subsidies’ allocation. Therefore, in this context the risk of 
crowding out effects associated with subsidies is higher. 
 
 
3.  Empirical strategy and descriptive analysis  
 
In  our  empirical  analysis  we  follow  three  different  but  complementary 
approaches. The first aims at the identification of firm-level persistence in the access 
to R&D subsidies by means of Transition Probability Matrixes (TPM). The second 
explores  the  determinants  of  firm-level  persistence  in  gaining  public  support  by 
means of a probit model. Finally, the third applies a propensity score matching 
method to evaluate the impact of public subsidies on firms’ innovative investments.  
The analysis is based on a dataset derived from the questionnaire surveys developed 
originally by the investment bank Mediocredito Centrale (MCC, now Unicredit), 
regarding a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms with more than 11 
employees.  The  original  MCC  database  comes  from  two  different  questionnaire 
waves,  each  of  them  collecting  contemporary  and  retrospective  (previous  three 
years) data from samples of more than 4000 firms. In order to obtain a dataset for 
our study, we merged two waves (covering years from 1998 to 2003). We finally   7
cleaned the dataset by eliminating outliers, ending up with a balanced dataset of 752 
manufacturing firms observed twice over a 6-year period3.  
Table  2  provides  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  sample  with  respect  to  key 
variables  for  our  analysis.  The  percentage  of  firms  who  have  accessed  to  R&D 
subsidies (either of national or EU source) were respectively 13.56% in the period 
1998-2000 and 22.61% in the period 2001-2003. In this last period in high-tech 
sectors 26.8% of firms was subsidized while in low-tech sectors the percentage was 
18.8%4. Table 2 shows the presence of significant differences in the values of key 
variables  including  R&D  investments  between  subsidized  and  non-subsidized 
companies. Such differences cannot be attributed to the work of R&D subsidies 
since they may simply reflect the selective nature of the group of funded firms. As it 
will be further discussed, this issue should be taken into account in the evaluation 
impact analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
The analysis of firm-level persistence in the access to R&D subsidies starts with the 
exam of the evidence provided by transition probability matrixes. This statistical 
tool allows to  model the sequence of subsidized and non-subsidized states as a 





Each  term  of  the  (2X2)  TPM  will  be  the  conditional  probability 
 , or the probability of moving from state j to state i.  
 
The  analysis  of  the  diagonal  terms,  based  on  estimated  transition  probabilities 
(Roper  and  Dundas,  2008),  allows  the  identification  of  specific  patterns  of 
persistence (Table 3 and Table 4). In the case of a 2-dimensional matrix there is 
evidence of persistence if the sum of the main diagonal terms is more than 1. Strong 
persistence is identified if the sum of the main diagonal terms is more than 1 and all 
the main diagonal terms are larger than 1/n (in this case 0.5).   
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
The study of the whole sample shows that while the probability of accessing public 
funding at time t for non-subsidized companies at t-1 is only 0.19, the probability of 
obtaining R&D subsidies in period t for subsidized firms in period t-1 is 0.45: more 
                                                 
3 A more detailed description of the database is provided in Antonelli and Crespi (2011).  
4 Sectors have been classified according to the OECD classification. In the group of high-tech sectors we 
included  medium-high  technology  industries;  in  the  group  of  low-tech  sectors  we  included  medium-low 
technology industries.     
     8
than the double. Symmetrically, the “negative” state dependence appears to be very 
strong in our sample, with 81% of non-subsidized companies in t-1 still not gaining 
access to public subsidies at time t. 
The  distinction  between  the  sectoral  composition  of  the  sample  in  terms  of 
different technological intensity of industries is also telling (Table 4). In the case of 
low-tech sectors the sum of the main diagonal terms is more than 1, with both the 
elements greater than 0.5 indicating the presence of strong persistence. In particular, 
for companies operating in this class of industries, while the probability of accessing 
public funding at time t for non-subsidized companies at t-1 is 0.16, the probability 
of obtaining R&D subsidies in period t for subsidized firms in period t-1 is 0.50 
(more than three times). In the same way the “negative” state dependence is strong 
with the share of non-subsidized companies in t-1 still not gaining access to public 
subsidies at time t equal to 0.84.  
Companies belonging to high-tech sectors are also characterised by persistence in 
the access to public subsidies, since the sum of the main diagonal terms is more 
than 1. However, our data show a lower level of state dependence with respect to 
the former case. The probability of accessing public funding at time t for non-
subsidized  companies  at  t-1  is  0.23,  while  the  probability  of  obtaining  R&D 
subsidies in period t for subsidized firms in period t-1 is 0.42 (nearly the double).    
  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Such results provide preliminary indications for state dependence in firm’s access to 
public  funds  for  R&D  investments,  with  differentiated  patterns  of  persistence 
across groups of sectors classified by their technological intensity. However, they do 
not provide, yet, a satisfactory and conclusive evidence that the observed persistence 
can be identified as true state persistence. Moreover, nothing can be said –yet- on 
the nature of the detected persistence, whether it is the result of a virtuous or a 
vicious  process.  The  econometric  analysis  proposed  in  the  next  section  aims 
specifically at isolating true state persistence effects, by controlling for a number of 
observable  characteristics  of  firms  that  might  shape  the  patterns  of  subsidies’ 
allocation and influence the identified persistence. Moreover, the probit models and 
the impact evaluation exercise will help us to qualify the nature of the observed 
persistence effects and its differentiated impact across groups of firms operating in 
sectors characterized by a different technology intensity. 
 
4.  Econometric analysis 
 
In this section we present the econometric model that tests the determinants 
of the access to R&D public support with special attention to firm’s past subsidy 
history and the methodology applied for the impact evaluation exercise. The analysis 
is based on a probit model in which the dependent variable is affected by a set of 
exogenous  control  variables  and  by  the  lagged  specification  of  the  dependent 
variable.  The  presence  of  the  lagged  outcome  variable  allows  us  to  test  the   9
hypothesis of true state dependence. In this way we aim at capturing the effect on 
firms’ current subsidy status of the event of being subsidized or not at time t-1.  
In  our  econometric  analysis  we  estimate  a  probit  model  of  the  event  (Y=1)  of 
receiving a public R&D subsidy that can be represented as follows: 
 
Pr(Yit = 1| Xit-1 , Yit-1)                 (1) 
 
where Xi,t-1 is a vector of observable firm i’s characteristics at t-1 and Yit-1 the event 
of being subsidized or not at time t-15. 
 
Control variables beside firms’ past R&D subsidy history have been selected in this 
study according to the empirical evidence that analysed this probability (Busom, 
2000; Wallsten, 2000; Arvanitis et al., 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Duguet, 
2004; Blanes and Busom, 2004; Görg, H. and E. Strobl, 2007; Hussinger, 2008). The 
theoretical and empirical literature points to a number of factors that are correlated 
to the probability of receiving a subsidy for R&D. Previous research has found that 
several firm characteristics, such as age, group membership, size, financial structure, 
past  R&D  and  innovation  efforts  or  export  activity,  are  correlated  with  public 
funding of R&D. Although the studies widely differ in the support programs under 
analysis, in almost all the studies large firms who planned their innovation activity 
and had previous R&D experience were the main beneficiaries of subsidies. 
 
In  more  detail  the  control  variables  used  in  our  baseline  specifications  are  the 
following: 
 
Firm size (lagged): Evaluation studies suggest that larger firms are more likely to be 
subsidized  than  smaller  firms.  This  is  in  part  due  to  the  positive  relationship 
between firm size and innovation activities which has been extensively debated in 
the literature (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). In the probit model, firm size is measured 
as the log of total number of employees. 
 
Firm age: Well established companies, with previous experience in the application 
process  for  public  funding  can  be  better  placed  in  the  competition  for  public 
funding. Moreover old firms may have had better opportunities with respect to new 
and  young  firms  to  establish  contacts  with  and  influence  the  support-granting 
authorities.  
 
Past  Innovative  Behaviour  Indicators:  Research  has  shown  that  previous 
innovation activities, proxied by patents or by the presence of R&D departments, 
are  positively  related  to  the  probability  of  being  subsidized  (Wallsten,  2000; 
Hussinger, 2008). Previous research activities  influence  the granting of subsidies 
because the firms that perform more R&D are the ones that are the most likely to 
apply for subsidies. It is in fact to be expected that those firms with previous R&D 
experience which systematically plan their activities, detailing them in a plan, will 
                                                 
5 Given the structure of our data for t has to be intended the years 2001-2003 and for t-1 the years 1998-2000.   10
find  making  the  request  for  subsidies  easier.  In  the  model  the  innovative 
background  is  approximated  by  the  percentage  of  R&D  personnel  over  total 
employee  and  by  a  dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  firm  introduced  any 
innovation at time t-1 or not. 
 
Export activity (lagged): Firms that export their products are usually exposed to 
strong international competition, and are likely to strengthen their competitiveness 
through innovation. Furthermore, one of the goals of R&D funding schemes may 
be to strengthen the competitiveness of firms in international markets. Thus, export 
activities can represent a signal for the allocation decision of the public R&D funds 
if  policymakers  are  believed  to  be  inclined  to  subsidize  R&D  projects  with 
potentially high international market success (Blanes and Busom, 2004). 
 
Other characteristics of the firm: We have considered other variables that might 
have  an  important  discriminatory  power  between  subsidised  and  non-subsidised 
firms. The relationship of these variables with innovation activities has been widely 
documented in the literature. In particular, the econometric specifications account 
for group membership, since firm belonging to a group may be better equipped to 
apply for a subsidy because resources at the corporate level, such as information, 
expertise and funds, are made available to the applicant; credit rationing (proxied 
by the percentage of firms declaring of having asked for additional funds being 
denied at t-1); the intensity of fixed capital investments measured as the log of 
fixed capital investments per employee at t-1 as well as ICT investments. 
As  previously  claimed,  we  believe  that  structural  difference  may  emerge  in  the 
working  of R&D subsidies between sectors characterized by a different technology 
intensity. For this reason all models will be tested on the whole sample and on the 
two  sub-samples  concerning  companies  operating  in  low-tech  and  high-tech 
industries.  
In the following Table 5 we report the definition of the variables that will be used in 
the different specifications of the model on the persistence of R&D subsidies. 
     
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Building on the results obtained from the probit model previously described it is 
possible to carry out an impact evaluation analysis on public R&D subsidies. In 
order to test the effect of public grants (treatment) on the targeted subjects (treated), 
it has to be taken into account that the receipt of a subsidy is not random, but rather 
it  is  subject  to  different  selection  processes.  Among  the  different  methods 
developed to perform impact evaluation analysis, the approach based on matching 
techniques has been widely used in recent years (Heckman et al., 1999, Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 2000;  Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Hussinger, 2008). In our analysis we 
follow this approach, which appears to be appropriate with respect to the objectives 
of the research and the statistical information available. Regarding this latter aspect, 
four important characteristics of the database used for the empirical analysis appear 
to be relevant for the effectiveness of the evaluation method adopted (Heckman,   11
Ichimura  and  Todd,  1998).  First,  the  information  on  both  supported  and  not-
supported firms is provided by the same survey; second, the data contain a rich set 
of variables on firms’ structure and behaviour relevant to modelling the participating 
decision; third, the goodness of matching is facilitated by the presence of a large 
number  of  non-treated  companies  in  the  sample;  finally,  the  use  of  two  survey 
waves allowed us to use lagged variables as controls in the selection equation so that 
we could reduce problems due to endogeneity. 
The crucial research issue in this type of analyses is to measure the effect of public 
R&D support on firms’ innovation performances in the absence of counterfactual 
evidence,  so  that  it  is  not  possible  to  forecast  the  result  of  firms’  innovation 
performances in the absence of subsidies. The solution that can be adopted in such 
circumstances is to use the results of non-treated firms, with similar characteristics, 
to estimate the possible effect on treated companies had they not participated in 
public funded R&D programmes. The basic idea of the matching is then to balance 
the sample of subsidy recipients and comparable non-recipients by selecting the best 
twin from the control group for each subsidized firm, so that the means of the 
outcome are comparable between the two groups. In this way, the differences in the 
means of the outcome variable between the treated and the selected control groups 
(Average Treatment Effect on the Treated – ATT) can be then attributed to the 
treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al. 1998).  
In the ideal case, the best twin for a subsidized firm is the firm which is identical in 
all relevant characteristics. However, when the number of matching criteria is large, 
it would be very difficult to find any such observation. A solution to this problem is 
represented  by  the  “propensity  score”  matching  (PSM)  method,  proposed  by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who demonstrated that it is possible to reduce the 
multi-dimensionality  of  the  matching  procedure  through  the  use  of  a  synthetic 
mono-dimensional  propensity  score.  The  procedure  consists  in  estimating  the 
propensity score which is the probability of accessing R&D subsidies for the whole 
sample and find pairs of treated and non-treated that have the same probability 
value of participation. Usually, a ‘nearest neighbour’ (NN) matching is performed, 
so that the control observation with the estimated probability value closest to the 
participant is selected. 
The Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) is only defined in the region 
of common support, since a major source of evaluation bias arises if the common 
support assumption is violated (Heckman et al., 1997). Hence, an important step is 
to check the overlap and the region of common support between treatment and 
comparison group. We therefore have to impose the restriction that the region of 
common support lies between the minimum and the maximum of the propensity 
score  of  the  comparison  group  and  consequently  drop  in  the  estimates  the 
treatment observations whose propensity score lies outside this region.  
Since  we  do  not  condition  on  all  covariates  but  on  the  propensity  score  it  is 
important to check if the matching procedure is able to balance the differences of 
the relevant variables in both the control and treatment group. In order to assess the 
quality of the matching we  will compare the situation before and after the NN 
matching  and  we  will  check,  with  two-sample  t-tests,  if  differences  after   12
conditioning on the propensity score have been eliminated. Finally, as a further test 
we will check the robustness of our results by using different matching estimators. 
 
5.  Empirical results 
 
Table  6  shows  the  results  for  different  specifications  of  the  probit  model 
regarding the determinants of firms’ access to public R&D subsidies for the whole 
sample. The same models are tested for the two separate sub-samples of high-tech 
and low-tech companies (Table 7).  
Globally,  the  predictions  of  the  probit  models  are  good  with  about  80%  of 
concordant  predictions  and  levels  of  the  likelihood  ratio  chi-square  always 
suggesting that our models, as a whole, are statistically significant. Results in general 
show that, even after controlling for a number of firm characteristics, the probability 
of observing a subsidized company in period t is still positively and significantly 
affected  by  its  R&D  subsidy  history.  Hence,  the  models  estimated  confirm  the 
picture  emerged  from  the  analysis  on  TPMs,  highlighting  the  presence  of  state 
dependence in the access of public R&D grants by firms, which, however, turns out 
to be shaped by specific firms’ idiosyncratic characteristics.  
The introduction of a number of different control variables allows us to test the 
robustness of the relationships identified between past and current realization of the 
dependent  variable.  Moreover,  the  significance  of  other  variables  entered  in  the 
models is most important as it confirms the path dependent character of the non-
ergodic persistence. Among the relevant factors, the size of observed companies, 
their age and the level of R&D capabilities, as measured by the share of internal 
R&D  personnel  over  total  employee,  significantly  enhance  the  probability  of 
subsequent  access  to  public  R&D  subsidies.  Since  large,  experienced  firms 
characterised by relevant R&D competences in the past are more likely to receive 
public R&D funding, we can interpret this result as evidence that the distribution 
policy of public agencies favoured firms guaranteeing the technical viability of the 
subsidised projects.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
These results can be qualified further by looking at differentiated patterns that can 
be observed for different groups of industries as shown in Table 7. Here a clear 
distinction emerges between companies operating in the two different groups of 
industries. In the case of low-tech industries, the past access to R&D subsidies is the 
only variable that appears to matter in every model specifications considered. On 
the contrary, for the group of firms in high-tech sectors, R&D subsidy history is 
statistically  relevant  but  with  a  lower  magnitude  and  other  characteristics  of 
companies appear to be important in shaping the probability of accessing subsidies. 
In particular firms’ research capabilities come out as a crucial determinant in the 
allocation of public resources in this field. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here]   13
 
These  results  are  consistent  with  our  research  hypotheses  and  have  relevant 
implications. In both cases Matthew effects apply, but they appear to have a distinct 
nature.  In  particular,  in  low-tech  sectors,  the  dynamics  of  the  process  is  past 
dependent  where  cumulative  and  self-reinforcing  reputational  effects  dominate 
whatever firms do along the process. On the contrary, in the case of high-tech 
sectors the process is path dependent: the past allocation of a public subsidy matters 
but does not guarantee that the firm will receive a subsidy in subsequent rounds of 
allocation.  When  competence-virtuous  Matthew  effects  apply,  firms’  specific 
behaviours  and  characteristics  are  relevant  in  shaping  committee  members 
perception  of  the  actual  technological  competence  accumulated  by  applicant 
companies also as a consequence of previous grants. 
 
Since  this  distinction  is  supposed  to  produce  effects  in  terms  of  differentiated 
success  of  the  policy  instrument  we  can  test  further  the  result  with  the  impact 
evaluation analysis based on the Propensity Score Matching method described in the 
previous section. Table 8 reports the non-parametric estimation results of average 
treatment effect obtained throw nearest neighbour matching for all the considered 
models. Results for the whole sample show that after controlling for selection bias 
the average subsidised firm has significantly greater R&D expenditure per employee 
compared to a twin-firm not supported by this type of public intervention. This 
evidence suggests that our data in general support the hypothesis of additionality of 
R&D  subsidies,  which  do  not  substitute  private  R&D  investments.  Moreover, 
regarding complementarity effects, the empirical evidence shows that grants do not 
induce firms to further increase private R&D investment as a response to public 
funding.  As  reported  in  Table  8,  firms  receiving  subsidies  are  characterised  by 
higher private R&D investments. However, the result is in general not statistically 
significant, suggesting that differences between granted and non granted firms are 
ambiguous.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In order to test if differentiated effects of subsidies across groups of sectors operate, 
we performed the impact evaluation analysis on the two subsamples of companies 
in high-tech and low-tech industries.  
Our results are clear cut and coherent with our hypotheses. All the tested models 
confirm that in the former group marked signs of additionality emerge from the 
analysis. Such evidence represents a further indication on the type of Matthew effect 
here in action, suggesting the prevalence of a virtuous-competence Matthew effect, 
where cumulability is at work and the persistence of the provision of subsidies is 
associated  with  firms  that  have  been  actually  able  to  use  previous  subsidies  to 
effectively increase their overall R&D activities. Conversely, in low-tech industries, 
additionality in R&D investments is not supported by data suggesting that some 
substitution  mechanism  has  taken  place  and  that  the  nature  of  the  identified 
persistence is mainly perverse.  
   14
Different  tests  have  been  carried  out  in  order  to  check  for  the  reliability  and 
robustness of our results. Firstly, we verified that after the matching procedures 
tests  show  that  all  considered  variables  are  balanced  in  both  groups,  with  the 
matching  strongly  reducing  the  bias  of  the  matched  groups  with  respect  to  the 
unmatched groups6. We further test the robustness of our results by using different 
matching estimators (See Table 9). First, we implemented a Caliper matching, which 
avoids the risk of bad matches if the closest neighbour is distant. Finally, since the 
NN  matching  is  a  one-to-one  technique  and  discards  data  that  are  potentially 
valuable, we performed a Kernel estimator, which makes it possible to match each 
treated with more than one comparable non-treated. In this last case we also used 
bootstrapped standard errors, so that the estimated variance of the treatment effect 
include the variance due to the derivation of the propensity score, the determination 
of common support and the order in which treated individuals are matched. The 
bootstrapping is based on 50 replications of the original sample. As shown in Table 
9 our results are robust to different model specifications and different matching 
techniques adopted. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
6.  Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The present paper has investigated the occurrence and the causes of persistence 
in the provision of public subsidies by means of discretionary allocation procedures. 
In particular, it articulated the notion of Matthew effect by distinguishing between 
virtuous  and  vicious.  The  former  consists  in  the  persistence  of  the  provision  of 
subsidies  to  firms  that  have  been  actually  able  to  use  previous  subsidies  to 
effectively  increase  their  competence,  their  internal  stock  of  technological 
knowledge and the flows of current R&D activities. The latter concerns the cases of 
persistence in the assignment of public subsidies based on sheer reputation, even to 
firms  that  have  actually  reduced  their  commitment  to  research  after  receiving 
previous subsidies. Moreover, it has been argued that such a distinction is relevant 
in  the  analysis  of  the  allocation  mechanisms  and  of  the  effects  of  subsidies  in 
different groups of industries characterized in terms of their technological intensity. 
The relevance of these arguments has been tested by implementing a rich strategy of 
empirical analysis based on the exam of transition probabilities between states, the 
development of an original model on the determinants of firm’s access to R&D 
grants and on an evaluation impact analysis adopting Propensity Score Matching 
methods. Both the descriptive and econometric evidences show that past grants 
increase the probability to access further funding and suggest that the access to 
public subsidies for R&D activities is indeed characterised by significant persistence. 
However,  such  a  persistent  character  of  R&D  subsidies  is  not  necessarily 
dysfunctional, but produces differentiated effects across sectors. In particular, the 
empirical analysis provides evidence on the working of a positive persistence, i.e. 
virtuous Matthew effects in high-tech industries, while signals of perverse effects are 
                                                 
6 We have omitted the table for reasons of space. Results of the tests are available from the authors on 
request.   15
observed in low-tech sectors. Our paper has shown that the basic critique of the 
discretionary  allocation  procedures  according  to  which  past  recipients  have 
disproportionate access to public support with respect to other firms that never 
received such a grant applies only and mainly in low-tech industries with low levels 
of knowledge cumulability. In such a case the persistence in the allocation of such 
grants can be interpreted as a reliable signal that perverse relations take place and 
exclude other firms less able to sneak in these complex bureaucratic procedures. 
Perverse  learning  processes,  exclusively  based  upon  the  better  understanding  by 
recurrent recipients of the working of the selection committees and the passive 
compliance of their members to reputational effects do impede, in these industries, 
the correct allocation of public funds to support R&D activities 
These results have important implications for designing and implementing targeted 
innovation policies. The characteristics of knowledge as an economic good provide 
the  basic  rationale  to  advocate  the  public  support  of  research  activities.  The 
identification and appreciation of the key role of knowledge cumulability provide a 
major  opportunity  for  innovation  policy  to  foster  the  rates  of  generation  of 
technological knowledge on two counts. First, when knowledge cumulability matters 
the likelihood that beauty contests allocation procedures are able to stir virtuous 
Matthew effects with positive feedbacks are higher. Second, the selective support of 
R&D activities characterized by high levels of knowledge cumulability can actually 
yield  positive  results  that  go  beyond  the  classical  remedy  to  knowledge  market 
failures so as to become a strategic tool to direct and implement the supply of 
technological knowledge in an economic system. Beauty contest allocation of public 
subsidies can become part of a wider industrial policy aimed at implementing and 
exploiting the complementarities among the research projects of the individual firms 
so as to strengthen their coherence at the system level (Mohen and Roller, 2005). 
Finally,  the  implications  of  our  results  are  most  important  as  they  provide  the 
foundation  to  support  the  implementation  of  discretionary  procedures  for  the 
allocation of selective subsidies to research projects mainly in high-tech industries. 
Automatic public incentives might apply in the rest of the economic system where 
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Table 1 The effects of Matthew dynamics 
    Path Dependence  Past Dependence 
   
Virtuous Matthew Effect 
 






Picking true innovators with high levels 
of knowledge cumulability and able to 
take advantage of learning to learn that 
increase both the total R&D budget 
and the flows of innovations 
Persistent inclusion of past 
occasional innovators that 
substitute private funds with 
public ones because of low levels 











Table 2 Summary statistics for the sample (years 2001-2003). 
   Total Sample  Access to R&D Subsidies 
         Yes  No 
   Mean  st dev  Mean  St. dev.  Mean  St. dev. 
Number of employees  139.69  520.35  222.06  948.21  115.63  293.08 
R&D per employee (Euro)  3308.51  4896.34  5241.93  6396.20  2743.76  4204.22 
Share of employees in R&D (%)  8.46  8.96  11.06  9.72  7.71  8.59 
Turnover (MEuro)  39.04  271.85  59.08  344.61  33.19  246.64 
Fixed capital investments/Emp. (Euro)   5334.325  6506.06  5582.54  6369.79  5261.82  5648.95 
Export  83.00%     85.12%     82.38%    
Access to R&D Subsidies (1998-2000)  13.56%                
Access to R&D Subsidies (2001-2003)  22.61%                
Number of firms in high-tech sectors  354                
Access to R&D Subsidies (2001-2003) 
high-tech sectors  26.84%           
Number of firms in low-tech sectors  398           
Access to R&D Subsidies (2001-2003) 
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Table 3 Transition probabilities between period T and T-1 along years 1998-2003.  
Full sample.  
            T 













Standard Errors in parentheses 
 
 
Table 4 Transition probabilities between period T and T-1 along years 1998-2003 in 
High-Tech and Low Tech industries. 
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Table 5 Definition of variables.  
R&D_SUB  Dummy variable that equals one if the company has access to public R&D subsidies 
SIZE  Log of the number of employees 
INNOV  Dummy variable that equals one if the company performs any innovation activity 
R&D_EMP  Share of R&D personnel over total employee (%) 
EXPORT  Dummy variable that equals one if the company exports 
INV_EMP  Log of the fixed investments per employee performed by the company  
ICT   
GROUP  Dummy variable that equals one if the company belongs to a group 
CRED_RAT  Dummy variable that equals one if the company declared having asked for credit being denied 
DEG_EMP  Share of personnel with university degree over total employee (%) 
AGE  Company’s age. 
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Table  6  Probit  model.  Dependent  variable:  Access  to  public  R&D  subsidies 
(R&D_SUB) 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)   
Model I  Model II  Model III 
       
R&D_SUB (t-1)  0.63***  0.63***  0.64*** 
  (0.144)  (0.144)  (0.145) 
AGE  0.01*  0.01*  0.01* 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
SIZE (t-1)  0.09*  0.09*  0.09 
  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.055) 
R&D_EMP (t-1)  0.01***  0.01**  0.01*** 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
CRED_RAT (t-1)  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07 
  (0.140)  (0.140)  (0.141) 
GROUP (t-1)  -0.05  -0.05  -0.04 
  (0.130)  (0.130)  (0.130) 
INV_EMP (t-1)  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.016) 
EXPORT (t-1)    -0.01  -0.00 
    (0.146)  (0.146) 
INNOV (t-1)    0.01  0.02 
    (0.123)  (0.123) 
ICT_EMP (t-1)      -0.01 
      (0.006) 
Constant  -1.44***  -1.44***  -1.43*** 
  (0.220)  (0.235)  (0.235) 
       
N. of firms  752  752  752 
       
LR Chi-sq.  42.66***  42.67***  44.46*** 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 Estimation of the ATT with the Nearest Neighbour Matching method. 
 
All Industries  Model   Mean   Difference   t-test 
      Treated  Control     
Outcome Variable           
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  5241.9  3404.8  1837.2  2.75 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  3751.8  3294.6  457.2  0.73 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  5241.9  2949.0  2292.9  3.42 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  3751.8  2846.9  904.9  1.45 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  5241.9  2385.5  2856.4  4.51 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  3751.8  2315.7  1436.0  2.43 
             
Low-Tech Industries           
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  3754.3  3100.3  654.0  0.66 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  2414.0  2911.0  -497.1  -0.52 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  3754.3  2927.0  827.3  0.86 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  2414.0  2759.5  -345.5  -0.38 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  3754.3  3304.0  450.2  0.52 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  2414.0  3192.6  -778.5  -0.83 
             
High-Tech Industries           
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  6416.4  3791.7  2624.7  2.57 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  4808.0  3654.1  1153.9  1.22 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  6416.4  3843.4  2573.0  2.63 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  4808.0  3793.2  1014.7  1.11 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  6416.4  3718.7  2697.7  2.87 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  4808.0  3503.8  1304.7  1.48 
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Table 9 Robustness Checks: Estimation of the ATT with the Nearest Neighbour 
Matching with Caliper and with Kernel method (Bootstrapped S.E.) 
Matching Method   
Nearest Neighbour with 
Caliper 
Kernel with Bootstrapped 
S.E 
             
All Industries  Model  ATT  t-test  ATT  z-test 
             
Outcome Variable           
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  1733.9  2.60  1879.6  3.80 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  374.7  0.60  538.7  0.97 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  2195.1  3.29  1878.9  3.18 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  827.8  1.32  537.9  1.21 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  2765.3  4.39  2081.5  3.55 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  1365.2  2.31  720.1  1.32 
             
Low-Tech Industries           
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  738.9  0.76  809.4  0.96 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  -466.7  -0.50  -434.4  -0.59 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  735.8  0.80  1066.1  1.58 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  -412.4  -0.47  -245.7  -0.41 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  384.0  0.43  998.2  1.23 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  -972.0  -1.15  -313.6  -0.48 
             
High-Tech Industries           
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  2659.7  2.65  2205.3  2.57 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  I  1187.8  1.28  805.9  1.13 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  2298.8  2.31  2455.7  2.87 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  II  821.4  0.88  1096.3  1.47 
             
R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  2568.5  2.71  2514.3  2.83 
PRIVATE R&D /EMPLOYEE  III  1110.6  1.24  1151.3  1.45 
 
 
 
 